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LABOR LAW-NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT-SYMPATHY STRIKES-
INJUNCTIONS-The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits a federal district court
from enjoining a sympathy strike, notwithstanding arbitration pro-
visions and an express no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement, since the strike is not over a grievance which the parties
agreed to submit to arbitration.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
Office clerical-technical employees of the Buffalo Forge Company
(employer) went on strike during negotiation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement and established picket lines at a number of the em-
ployer's plants. Pursuant to the respondent union's' instructions,
the employer's production and maintenance workers, in support of
the striking office employees, refused to cross the picket lines. The
employer and the respondent union were parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement which contained a no-strike clause' and griev-
ance and arbitration provisions for settling disputes between the
production and maintenance employees and the Buffalo Forge Com-
pany.' Asserting that the production employees' work stoppage was
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement's no-strike
clause, the employer filed a complaint under section 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act4 in the District Court for the
Western District of New York. It requested a preliminary injunction
1. Both the production and maintenance employees and the office clerical-technical em-
ployees were represented by the same international union, the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO. The office employees were represented by local unions not parties to the
litigation. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1976).
2. The agreement provided: "There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or
impeding of work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid
or condone any such activities." Id. at 3143 n.1.
3. The agreement stated that any differences which might arise between the employer and
any employee covered by the agreement would be immediately settled by an arbitration
procedure. See id. at 3143-44.
4. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). Section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 301].
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of the sympathy strike and an order compelling the parties to sub-
mit the dispute to grievance procedures.5 The district court held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited issuing an injunction., In
its view, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,7 which au-
thorized an injunction of a strike over a grievance the parties had
agreed to arbitrate, was not applicable since the production employ-
ees' sympathy strike was not over an arbitrable dispute.' Adopting
the district court's rationale, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision.9
THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. 0 Justice White
spoke for the majority and held that the Boys Markets exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on federal injunctions in labor
strikes was not controlling in a sympathy strike situation. The pur-
pose behind Boys Markets was to implement congressional prefer-
ence for private settlement, through arbitration, of disputes be-
tween employers and their employees." The quid pro quo for the
employer's promise to submit to the arbitration of disputes was the
union's promise not to strike over issues that were subject to the
5. 386 F. Supp. 405, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). At the hearing, the union offered to submit
the question of the work stoppage's validity to arbitration on proper notice by the employer.
See 96 S. Ct. at 3144.
6. 386 F. Supp. at 410. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute
• . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employ-
ment;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
7. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See notes 32-36 and accompanying text infra.
8. 386 F. Supp. at 409. The district court concluded that the production employees were
engaged in a sympathy strike in support of the office employees; the work stoppage was not
in protest of the employer's order that union members drive non-company owned trucks
through the picket lines, a dispute which would have been subject to the mandatory grievance
procedure. Id.
9. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. 96 S. Ct. at 3146.
11. See 398 U.S. at 253.
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arbitration provisions of the contract." A strike over a dispute which
the parties had agreed to settle in this manner would deprive the
employer of its bargain and frustrate the arbitration process; 3
hence, the Court in Boys Markets had reasoned that a qualification
of the literal commands of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was war-
ranted. 4 The underlying dispute in Buffalo Forge, however, was the
employer's failure to come to terms with sister local unions. Neither
the sympathy strike's causes, nor its underlying issue was subject
to the settlement procedures provided by the bargaining agreement
between the union and the employer. 15 Since the contract contained
a clause for settling disputes over the interpretation of the contract's
provisions, the Court conceded that the question of whether the
strike violated the no-strike clause was arbitrable. In the majority's
view, although the union had agreed to arbitrate the validity of the
sympathy strike, enjoining the strike before arbitration was not
needed to carry out the promise to arbitrate." Therefore, the con-
cerns underlying Boys Markets were not present in Buffalo Forge
and the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition of federal injunctions
should prevail. 7
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion and rejected the
majority's narrow interpretation of Boys Markets.' Relying on a
case decided after Boys Markets, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW," he
argued that the authority to enjoin a strike under section 301 de-
pended not on whether the dispute was over an arbitrable issue but
on whether the union was under a contractual duty not to strike.20
12. 96 S. Ct. at 3147. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra for a discussion of the
Court's reasoning. The dissent disagreed with the majority's conceptualization of the union's
quid pro quo. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text infra.
13. 96 S. Ct. at 3147. The Supreme Court has viewed arbitration as a "kingpin of federal
labor policy." See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
14. See 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
15. Id. For a thorough analysis of the sympathy strike situation in which the author
asserts that a sympathy strike is over an arbitrable grievance within the meaning of Boys
Markets see Connolly & Connolly, Employers' Rights Relative to Sympathy Strikes, 14 DuQ.
L. REv. 121 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Connolly].
16. 96 S. Ct. at 3149. The Court noted that under the terms of the contract, the employer
would be entitled to invoke the arbitration process to determine the legality of the strike, and
could obtain a court order requiring the union to arbitrate if it refused to do so. Id. at 3146.
17. Id. at 3149.
18. Id. at 3150 (dissenting opinion).
19. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
20. 96 S. Ct. at 3150 (dissenting opinion). The Buffalo Forge majority responded to this
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He considered a union's undertaking not to strike to be its quid pro
quo for the employer's agreement to submit grievances to binding
arbitration." Section 301 extended federal jurisdiction to grant re-
lief in labor disputes to facilitate enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Enforcement of a contractual commitment of the
union to arbitrate grievances was a basic objective of Boys Markets
and enjoining the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge would be war-
ranted to protect the arbitration process. According to Justice Ste-
vens, the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not prevent the expansion
of Boys Markets to reach a sympathy strike clearly in violation of a
no-strike clause. The Act's goal of insuring a union's ability to freely
negotiate a contract would not be implemented by such an injunc-
tion.2" In Justice Stevens' view, to properly accommodate the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 301, the Court should simply
require that before an injunction issues, there be convincing evi-
dence that the work stoppage is a violation of a contractual duty not
to strike. If the lower court determines that the sympathy strike is
clearly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, federal
jurisdiction would lie under section 301 and the strike could be
enjoined.?
RECONCILING SECTION 301 AND THE NORRIS -LAGUARDiA ACT
Buffalo Forge required the Court to reconsider the proper balance
between the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against federal in-
contention by stating that the authority to enjoin the strike in Gateway Coal was first prem-
ised on the Court's determination that the underlying dispute was arbitrable. 96 S. Ct. at
3147-48 n.10. See also note 40 infra.
In Gateway Coal, the union refused to arbitrate the issue of an alleged safety hazard created
by the employer and engaged in a strike. Despite a broad arbitration clause, there was a
serious question whether the dispute was arbitrable. The workers were unlikely to defer
matters concerning their own safety to an arbitrator. The Supreme Court upheld the district
court injunction issued under the authority of Boys Markets. 414 U.S. at 387. The Court
disposed of this substantial question of contract interpretation by invoking the "presumption
of arbitrability" previously articulated in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). See 414 U.S. at 379. The Court separately addressed the issue of
the district court's authority to enjoin the work stoppage, and held that the authority de-
pended on the union's contractual duty not to strike. Id. at 380. Since the duty to arbitrate
gave rise to an implied no-strike obligation, the union's work stoppage was a violation of the
bargaining agreement and therefore enjoinable. Id. at 381-82.
21. 96 S. Ct. at 3152-54 (dissenting opinion).
22. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text infra.
23. 96 S. Ct. at 3159 (dissenting opinion).
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junctions of labor strikes and section 301's command to honor
contractually created arbitration procedures designed to peacefully
resolve labor disputes. In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act 4 to limit federal intervention in labor disputes
which previously had been marked by broad, ex parte injunctions
against striking unions. 25 As a result of the Act's protection of labor's
ability to organize and to bargain collectively, unions grew in
strength and Congress eventually found it necessary to take steps
to control the flood of strikes hampering the economy. In 1948, it
passed the Labor Management Relations Act, 2 which included sec-
tion 301, to promote collective bargaining and support existing
agreements freely bargained for. In enacting the new law, Congress
did not repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nor did it state what relief
federal courts could grant under section 301. The Supreme Court
reconciled the two federal statutes in the landmark case of Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.Y It held that federal courts had
jurisdiction to compel arbitration pursuant to a collective bargain-
ing agreement despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court rea-
soned that section 301 authorized federal courts to enforce collective
bargaining agreements based on its belief that Congress had indi-
cated industrial peace could best be obtained by assuring perform-
ance of agreed-upon settlement procedures. 2
Fears that Lincoln Mills' construction of section 301 would pro-
mote massive federal intervention in labor disputes were dispelled
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1970). For the text of the relevant portion of the Act see
note 6 supra.
25. By enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress attempted to "correct the abuses
that had resulted from the interjection of the federal judiciary into union-management dis-
putes on the behalf of management." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 251 (1970). The federal courts had been regarded as allied with management in an
attempt to prevent the strengthening of labor unions. Id. at 250. See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-82, 185-88, 191-97 (1970). The declared purpose of
the Act was
to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations
affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other . . . [and to] proscribe
practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical
to the general welfare . ...
Id. § 141 (1970). See 398 U.S. at 251.
27. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
28. Id. at 455. In Lincoln Mills, the Court first announced that the union's no-strike
agreement was the quid pro quo for an employer's agreement to arbitrate. Id.
1976-77
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by the Supreme Court in the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy." In this
series of cases, the Court established a policy of judicial deference
to the arbitration procedure chosen by the parties. Justice Douglas
stated that in claims brought under section 301, federal courts were
to presume a grievance was covered under the arbitration agree-
ment; they were, therefore, precluded from ruling on the merits of
the dispute.e In the years following its decisions in the Steelworkers
Trilogy, the Court maintained a pro-arbitration position,3' but was
eventually faced with deciding whether a union's strike over a dis-
pute it had agreed to submit to arbitration could be enjoined under
section 301. In Boys Markets, which overruled a contrary decision
in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,2 the Court declared that an
accommodation of section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
required 33 if the arbitration procedure was to be effectively en-
29. The three cases generally referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy are: United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the
Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215 [hereinafter cited as Gould].
30. The Court emphasized § 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1970), which states that final adjustment of disputes between labor and manage-
ment by the method they agreed upon is desired. 363 U.S. at 566.
31. See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), where the Court
expanded the quid pro quo theory by upholding a damage award to an employer for a union
strike despite the absence of an express no-strike obligation. The Court determined that the
agreement contained an implied no-strike clause since it expressly imposed binding arbitra-
tion on the parties. A strike to settle a dispute subject to arbitration frustrated federal labor
policy as manifested in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Id. at 105. Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (strikes over issues properly submit-
ted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board pursuant to the Railway Labor Act enjoined
to insure effectiveness of the Act).
32. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In Sinclair, the Court held that the broad, inclusive language of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented the injunction of a union's strike over an arbitrable
dispute in a section 301 action. The Sinclair decision surprised a number of commentators.
See, e.g., Isaacson, A Fresh Look at the Labor Injunction, 1971 LAB. L. DEv. 231; Keene, The
Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond,
15 VILL. L. REv. 32 (1969).
33. The accommodation was appropriate since the Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive
to a labor situation totally different from that existing in 1970. See 398 U.S. at 250. The public
policy underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act is explicitly set forth in the statute:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions. . . [the] worker is commonly help-
less to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment . . . [it is neces-
sary] that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
• . . in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid . ...
Recent Decisions
forced .3 The Court ruled that despite the absolute language in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, a strike over an arbitrable grievance could
be enjoined provided: (1) the parties were contractually bound to
arbitrate the grievance; (2) the employer was required to arbitrate
the grievance as a condition of obtaining the injunction; and (3) the
injunction was warranted under general equity principles.3 The
Court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one, not intended
to undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.36
REQUIREMENT THAT THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE BE
OVER AN ARBITRABLE ISSUE
The Boys Markets test for injunctive relief was not easily applied
in a Buffalo Forge situation due to the nature of a dispute leading
to a sympathy strike. In Boys Markets, the grievance that the par-
ties had agreed to arbitrate-work assignments-provoked a strike
which allegedly violated the no-strike clause. 37 The strike was over
a dispute which the employer and the employees had agreed to
arbitrate. In Buffalo Forge, the union had called a strike not by
reason of any dispute it or any of its members had with the em-
ployer, but in support of other local unions. The validity of the
sympathy strike itself, however, did produce a dispute which the
parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. Circuit courts had
been evenly divided on whether injunctive relief was proper under
these circumstances .3  Those circuits that held sympathy strikes
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court observed that the core purpose
of the Act was not sacrifice d by granting an injunction which merely enforces an obligation
the union freely undertook. 398 U.S. at 252.
34. In Boys Markets, the union protested the employer's assignment of certain work to
supervisory personnel. When the employer refused to alter the situation, the union struck
despite an express no-strike clause and an arbitration clause which appeared to cover the
dispute in question. The Supreme Court held that since the purpose of the arbitration proce-
dure was to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of disputes without resort
to strikes, its effectiveness was undercut if there were no immediate remedy for those tactics
which arbitration was designed to eliminate. Id. at 249.
35. Id. at 254. The Boys Markets requirements were initially tested in Parade
Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1972) (injunction
improperly issued where employer failed to affirmatively allege that union's strike was over
an arbitrable issue and merely suggested that an arbitrator might determine the question in
the future).
36. 398 U.S. at 253.
37. Id. at 239.
38. The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits had enjoined sympathy strikes, while the
1976-77
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enjoinable apparently believed the federal pro-arbitration policy
warranted injunctive relief; since the goal of arbitration was to
peacefully settle disputes, the union should be prevented from strik-
ing while arbitrating the right to strike .3  Those circuits that held
sympathy strikes not enjoinable emphasized the narrowness of Boys
Markets' qualification of the Norris-LaGuardia Act;' 0 an injunction
should be granted only when a strike is over an arbitrable dispute."
In Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court settled the issue by, in effect,
recognizing that only a portion of the union's quid pro quo is en-
forceable by injunction . 2 Although the union's commitment not to
strike is its quid pro quo for the employer's agreement to arbitrate,
the union's obligation is enforceable only if the strike is caused by
a grievance subject to the parties' arbitration procedure. While a
Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits refused to issue injunctions under these circumstances; the
Seventh Circuit had conflicting decisions. See 96 S. Ct. at 3145-46 n.9.
39. See, e.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). See also Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers
Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd mer., 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976) (since work stoppage
precipitated an arbitrable dispute, it makes no sense to argue that sympathy strike is not a
work stoppage over an arbitrable dispute).
40. Some commentators had believed that Gateway Coal signaled the expansion of Boys
Markets. See, e.g., Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross
a Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. Rlv. 113, 123 (1976). Prior to Gateway Coal, it had been suggested
that the Boys Markets requirement that the strike be over a dispute subject to the arbitration
provisions of the contract could not be satisfied by a court's presumption that a dispute is
arbitrable. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,
85 HARv. L. RPv. 636 (1972). Others argued that a duty to arbitrate should not give rise to an
"implied" no-strike obligation supporting a Boys Markets injunction. See Note, The New
Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970). Gateway Coal dispelled the
possibility of either of these limitations on Boys Markets. See note 20 supra.
In Gateway Coal, the Court utilized the "presumption of arbitrability," developed in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, to expand the basis of federal equity jurisdiction. A strike over a sub-
stantial question of contract interpretation could be enjoined if the agreement provided that
such questions were to be arbitrated. See 414 U.S. at 384. Federal authority to issue an
injunction was dependent on the union's violation of a no-strike obligation. In Gateway Coal,
however, it was not clear that the union had an obligation not to strike since it was not certain
whether the dispute was arbitrable. Arguably, Gateway Coal represented an erosion of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act beyond Boys Markets since the decision increased the risk a lawful
strike might be enjoined. Accord, 96 S. Ct. at 3158 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Norris-
LaGuardia Act does not eliminate the danger of an erroneously issued injunction).
41. See, e.g., Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union Local 53, 520
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3150 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the majority's rationale, however,
there was no splitting of the quid pro quo. The union's obligation not to strike extended only
to arbitrable disputes. Id. at 3146.
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sympathy strike creates a question of contract interpretation which
the union may have agreed to settle by arbitration, the strike is not
caused by an arbitrable issue. Such a strike is not a proper subject
for injunctive relief.
The basic labor policy which prompted the Boys Markets
decision-protection of the arbitration procedure 3-supports the
requirement adopted in Buffalo Forge that the strike must be over
a dispute subject to the contract's arbitration provisions. The
union's strike in Boys Markets was designed to force the employer
to concede an arbitrable issue, and was therefore an attempt by the
union to avoid its obligation to arbitrate the disputed issue. An
injunction was necessary to insure that the arbitration process was
not disrupted. A sympathy strike such as in Buffalo Forge, however,
is not called as a result of a grievance the union has with the em-
ployer; therefore, it is not intended to force settlement of an issue
which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. The sympa-
thy strike in Buffalo Forge, motivated by the union's desire to sup-
port a sister union in its negotiations with the employer, is not an
effort to avoid an obligation to arbitrate." Even if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate questions of contract interpretation, including
the scope of a no-strike clause, to enjoin a strike arising from a
dispute which the parties did not agree to arbitrate would arguably
interfere with the arbitrator's function 5 without furthering a main
concern of Boys Markets-enforcing the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate certain grievances. To this extent, the policy underlying Boys
Markets is not subverted when a federal court refuses to enjoin a
sympathy strike.
A difficulty with the majority position in Buffalo Forge, however,
is that other considerations supported the Boys Markets decision,
policy concerns which may be applicable to a sympathy strike situa-
tion despite the fact the strike is not over an arbitrable dispute. A
goal of federal labor law is to substitute arbitration for the economi-
cally destructive strike, as permitted by the parties' agreement." In
the collective bargaining agreement at issue in Buffalo Forge, the
43. See note 34 supra.
44. For a detailed analysis of the propriety of the "underlying dispute" requirement see
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324-33 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
45. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
46. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962). See note 31 supra.
1976-77
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parties agreed there would be no work stoppages and all disputes
would be arbitrated. Arguably, the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, insuring the union's ability to negotiate, would not be offended
by forcing the production employees to honor the no-strike obliga-
tion they freely undertook. 7 Indeed, in Boys Markets, the Court had
recognized that the union's obligation not to strike, its quid pro quo,
must be specifically enforced along with the employer's obligation
to submit disputes to arbitration machinery, if the quid pro quo
theory was to have any rationality. 8
While this analysis would tend to undermine the holding of
Buffalo Forge, the majority's view is supported by another well-
established policy of federal labor law. When a federal court is asked
to enjoin a sympathy strike pending binding arbitration, it has not
yet been determined whether the sympathy strike violates an exist-
ing no-strike clause. It is conceivable that a sympathy strike is not
a bona fide "strike" as contemplated by the parties in the no-strike
clause, and hence, not a violation of their collective bargaining
agreement. 9 It may be true that the union and the employer had
agreed that an arbitrator would resolve their differences of interpre-
tation of the collective bargaining agreement, including the scope
of the no-strike clause; but a court's authority to enjoin a strike
under the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
depends on whether the union is under a contractual duty not to
47. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
48. 398 U.S. at 248.
49. The illegality of a strike is a complex issue. The right to strike and the right to refuse
to cross another union's picket line are protected by both the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1970), and the Labor Management Relations Act, id. §§ 157-58,
163 (1970). This right can be waived in the collective bargaining agreement, although the
cases are not consistent as to the clarity required for a waiver to be effective. Compare, e.g.,
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (employer permitted to discharge
employee for refusal to cross a picket line under contract provision prohibiting strikes or other
cessation of work), with, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (union
undertaking not to engage in work stoppage does not waive right to strike solely in response
to unfair labor practices of employer). The individual's right to strike is distinct from the
union's, and may not be waived merely by a no-strike clause in the union's contract with the
employer. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850
(1972); Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1486, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C. 1971).
Concerted action by individual members of a union, even without official sanction, is, how-
ever, generally deemed to be union action. See United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563
(D.D.C. 1948), afrd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949) (president of
UMW could not disclaim responsibility for simultaneous nationwide work stoppage by union
members).
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strike.5° To enjoin the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge would in
effect be a decision that the strike was illegal, the functional equiva-
lent of a decision on the merits of the only dispute subject to arbitra-
tion. Not only have the parties not bargained for a federal court's
determination of law and fact before an arbitrator has had the op-
portunity to consider the issues,' but also such decision-making by
the courts arguably contravenes the Steelworkers Trilogy's policy of
judicial deference to the expertise of arbitrators. 52 Concededly,
under Boys Markets, federal courts may become involved in con-
tract interpretation-they must initially determine if the dispute
underlying any strike is arbitrable.0 Yet, even in these circumstan-
ces, the courts do not reach the merits of the underlying dispute;
this judgment is left to an arbitrator. Although in Gateway Coal the
Court did acknowledge that substantial questions of contract inter-
pretation might be grounds for federal equity jurisdiction,4 a federal
court's interpretation of whether a dispute is arbitrable under the
contract will not settle the dispute between the parties as would
a determination that a sympathy strike is enjoinable. Thus, while
Buffalo Forge may represent a retrenchment of Gateway Coal, a
contrary result would have involved a greater usurpation of the
50. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380 (1974).
51. It is apparent the parties did not agree that the courts should resolve disputes as to
the meaning of the agreement; such questions are reserved for the arbitrator. Some courts
have reasoned, however, that enjoining a sympathy strike is not a decision on the merits. The
union's right to honor a picket line would not be nullified by the injunction; the right is merely
suspended until it is established by an arbitrator. See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). This
approach fails to take into account that timing is critical to the success of a strike; even a
temporary injunction can permanently defeat its purpose. See Dunau, Three Problems in
Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. Rav. 427, 467 (1969). Because of a shortage of arbitrators, there
are often long delays in arbitration, compounding the effect of the temporary injunction. See
Cohen, The Search for Innovative Procedures in Labor Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 104, 107 (1974).
Also, congressional preference for agreed-upon settlement procedures is thwarted since, in
many instances, courts may permanently resolve contract disputes at the preliminary injunc-
tion stage. See 96 S. Ct. at 3149.
52. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
The question of whether a no-strike clause was breached by a sympathy strike is best left to
an arbitrator skilled in the interpretation of labor contracts. See Connolly, supra note 15, at
140.
53. One commentator has criticized Boys Markets as infringing upon the arbitrator's
domain, to the extent its holding requires some degree of contract interpretation by the
courts. See Markson, The End of an Experiment in Arbitral Supremacy: The Death of
Sinclair, 21 LAB. L.J. 645 (1970).
54. 414 U.S. at 384.
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arbitrator's function. Buffalo Forge's determination that an injunc-
tion is not authorized solely because it is alleged the strike violates
the no-strike clause appears sound at least within the existing poli-
cies of federal labor law. 5
IMPACT OF BUFFALO FORGE
It seems clear that the rationale in Buffalo Forge extends beyond
the sympathy strike situation. The Court's holding would appear to
be apposite to any strike which is not "over an arbitrable dispute."
Such a strike under Buffalo Forge is simply not amenable to federal
injunctive relief. In view of the majority's concern that a contrary
decision could involve the federal courts in a burdensome amount
of litigation,56 the decision's probable effect is a desirable one of
reducing the role of the federal courts in labor disputes. The decision
may also have practical effects on the relations between labor and
management and the collective bargaining agreements they negoti-
ate. Although it remains to be seen whether a refusal to enjoin a
sympathy strike will interfere with the subsequent arbitration pro-
cedure, a union may employ procedures to delay final arbitration
55. The majority did indicate a willingness to enjoin a sympathy strike following an
arbitrator's decree that the strike is illegal. See 96 S. Ct. 3146. Although the Supreme Court
has not ruled on this issue, the power to do so has been recognized by a lower court. See New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). Furthermore, the power to enforce an arbitrator's award
appears to be consistent with the federal labor policy of promoting arbitration. See generally
Gould, supra note 29, at 246.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that, assuming the existence of the power to
enjoin the strike after an arbitrator's decree, the Buffalo Forge decision was inconsistent with
federal labor policy. The effect of arbitration is to remove any ambiguity from the collective
bargaining agreement. The sympathy strike may so clearly violate the agreement that its
validity does not present a bona fide issue for submission to an arbitrator. Under these
circumstances, the court should have the authority to enforce the no-strike clause. See 96 S.
Ct. at 3156 (dissenting opinion).
The dissent's "clear violation of a no-strike agreement" approach may be less of an infringe-
ment on the Norris-LaGuardia Act than the Gateway Coal decision; a legal sympathy strike
is not likely to be enjoined. See note 40 supra. But a judicial determination of even a clear
violation of a no-strike clause arguably contravenes the Steelworkers Trilogy's policy of non-
intervention in arbitrable matters. It is not only the possible lack of a judge's competence in
labor matters which gave rise to this policy; there is also a congressional preference that
disputes be settled in the manner the parties negotiated. See note 30 and accompanying text
supra.
56. See 96 S. Ct. at 3149 n.12.
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while it continues to strike. 7 Since employers are now without as-
surance of uninterrupted business operations, and are therefore de-
prived of a prime impetus for agreeing to arbitrate, the Buffalo
Forge decision may discourage them from agreeing to binding arbi-
tration in the future. Without an arbitration clause, however, the
employer lacks even the protection of a Boys Markets injunction."
Buffalo Forge may force employers to rely on other remedies59 to
enforce a no-strike clause when injunctive relief is not available.
The decision may also reduce the number of section 301 damage
actions based on a breach of an implied no-strike obligation of the
union, in view of the Court's dictum that an agreement to arbitrate,
standing alone, does not imply a duty not to engage in sympathy
strikes." As an alternative, an employer may opt for an expedited
57. In Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court suggested a different effect on the arbitration
process if injunctions were authorized; a court's initial determination that a sympathy strike
is illegal, though not technically binding on the arbitrator's subsequent ruling, may overly
influence his decision. 96 S. Ct. at 3149. Cf. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (issuing an injunction is
likely to discourage arbitration since employer will utilize procedural delays in arbitration).
58. Traditionally, it had been assumed that without specific enforcement of the no-strike
obligation, there was no incentive for employers to enter into arbitration agreements. See 398
U.S. at 248. Empirical evidence from the period following Sinclair, however, indicates that
despite the nonavailability of injunctive relief, employers are still willing to enter into manda-
tory arbitration agreements. See Gould, supra note 29, at 246. Gould suggested that the short-
run impact of Boys Markets could be to increase work stoppages over terms in a new contract
since the powerful industrial unions might demand elimination of no-strike clauses. Id. at
267. Buffalo Forge will serve to limit the conditions under which a no-strike obligation will
be specifically enforced against a union, thus possibly reducing the demand for the elimina-
tion of such clauses.
59. Other remedies available to the employer include an action for damages against the
union for injury resulting from an illegal strike, or disciplining or discharging employees for
refusing to cross a picket line. See Connolly, supra note 15, at 143-63; Edwards & Bergmann,
The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No-
Strike" Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J. 3 (1970). These remedies, however, are often determined
to be inadequate since retribution after a work stoppage is a poor substitute for an immediate
halt to an illegal strike. See 398 U.S. at 248. Furthermore, employers are often reluctant to
use these other remedies since they tend to aggravate labor relations. Gould, supra note 29,
at 230.
Generally, where the parties have a broad agreement to arbitrate all complaints, disputes,
or grievances arising between them, an employer who seeks damages or disciplinary action
for a violation of a no-strike agreement must proceed to arbitration. See Drake Bakeries, Inc.
v. American Bakery & Confectionary Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
60. In Buffalo Forge, the Court noted that lower courts which had assumed that a manda-
tory arbitration clause implied a commitment not to engage in sympathy strikes were in error.
96 S. Ct. at 3147 n.10. Buffalo Forge apparently limits the scope of the implied no-strike
clause established in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See note
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arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement to mini-
mize the time delay between a union's alleged violation of a no-
strike clause and an arbitrator's decision that the clause was vio-
lated.' An expedited arbitration clause would have the advantage
of reducing a sympathy strike's potentially deleterious effect on
productivity.
CONCLUSION
Boys Markets returned to the federal courts the authority to en-
join certain labor strikes, a power which Congress had previously
sought to eliminate by enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Buffalo
Forge conclusively establishes that this equitable remedy is to be
used only when necessary to insure compliance with a negotiated
arbitration procedure. The decision, perhaps, represents a revitali-
zation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and at least a temporary end to
any further expansion of the federal court's power to intervene in
labor disputes. Moreover, the Court's expressed concern with em-
broiling district courts in massive preliminary injunction litigation 2
may signal a rethinking of the scope of federal jurisdiction under
section 301.
George C. Werner
31 supra. A sympathy strike is not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore does not violate
an implied no-strike clause. The basis of a section 301 damage action is an illegal strike.
Buffalo Forge may preclude the granting of damages by a federal court where the employer
alleges the sympathy strike violates an implied no-strike clause.
61. Expedited arbitration is an optional process which the parties may employ for han-
dling certain disputes. Generally, a hearing is commenced within 72 hours after the dispute
arises. The parties, however, usually limit this procedure to routine matters. See Cohen,
supra note 51, at 106.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 3149 n.12.
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